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ABSTRACT Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems, mainly represented by vehicular ad hoc net-
works (VANETs), are among the key components contributing to the Smart City and SmartWorld paradigms.
Based on the continuous exchange of both periodic and event triggeredmessages, smart vehicles can enhance
road safety, while also providing support for comfort applications. In addition to the different communication
protocols, securing such communications and establishing a certain trustiness among vehicles are among the
main challenges to address, since the presence of dishonest peers can lead to unwanted situations. To this
end, existing security solutions are typically divided into two main categories, cryptography and trust, where
trust appeared as a complement to cryptography on some specific adversary models and environments where
the latter was not enough to mitigate all possible attacks. In this paper, we provide an adversary-oriented
survey of the existing trust models for VANETs. We also show when trust is preferable to cryptography, and
the opposite. In addition, we show how trust models are usually evaluated in VANET contexts, and finally,
we point out some critical scenarios that existing trust models cannot handle, together with some possible
solutions.
INDEX TERMS VANETs, trust management, attacker models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ensuring secure and trusted communications within Vehic-
ular Ad hoc NETworks (VANETs) is a complex task due
to the different threats to be addressed [1], where the most
dangerous ones are those targeting safety alert services.
Tremendous efforts have been made by researchers at
both academia and industry to provide security solutions
for all kinds of networks including VANETs. Most of the
existing security solutions for VANETs inherit cryptography
efficiency in terms of secure and confidential communication,
and they use different software and hardware components
to reach their goals such as certificates [2], signatures [3],
Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) [4], intrusion detection
systems [5], and trusted third parties [6].
On the other hand, in some critical cases like high mobil-
ity scenarios in the absence of infrastructures, cryptography
solutions cannot perform as well as expected. In addition,
if an authorized and authenticated user becomes malicious,
or is under the control of an attacker, classical cryptography
solutions are easily overtaken. Hence, to fill the gap of
cryptography against inside attackers, trust management is
usually adopted. Trust models were inspired by economic
science [7], [8], and can be used for different networks and
applications. Trust can be defined as a subjective belief of
a peer about other peers belonging to the same society or
geographical zone [9].
For the VANET case, trust establishment is based on the
evaluation of direct historical interactions, as well as on the
indirect recommendations among vehicles that are gathered.
Thus, trust evaluation is mostly based on the recent history
regarding data exchanges, and it does not have any negative
impact on message treatment and transmission delays.
Existing trust models for VANETs are generally classified
into entity-oriented, data-oriented, and hybrid trust models
depending of the revocation target, which can be either dis-
honest entities, malicious messages, or both of them [10].
As mentioned above, in the scope of VANETs, trust
mostly addresses inside attackers as cryptography has already
showed its efficiency in handling outside unauthorized attack
attempts. In other words, trust mainly deals with inside
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attackers in those situations where cryptography completely
fails, also contributing to enhance cryptography in case of
delay-sensitive infrastructureless environments, which is the
case of VANETs.
In this paper we clearly point out when and where trust is
a better choice than, or a complement of cryptography, and
the opposite. We also explain the main features, differences,
advantages and drawbacks of both trust and cryptography.
In addition, an adversary-oriented survey of the existing trust
establishment solutions is also provided. We show some spe-
cific attacks trying to bypass both cryptography and trust
solutions, and how the latter can be enhanced to detect such
threats. Finally, we show how the existing trust models for
VANETs are usually evaluated.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in section II
we acknowledge the exiting survey papers addressing either
cryptography or trust management solutions for VANETs.
In section III we point out the main security requirements and
countermeasures for a secure vehicular network. Section IV
details the features and differences between trust and cryp-
tography, together with a survey of the existing trust models
for VANETs. Then, in section V, we provide a performance
evaluation-oriented study of existing trust models. Later,
learned lessons and future directions for trust management in
VANETs are discussed in section VI, which also highlights
those security threats able to bypass the existing trust mod-
els, along with possible solutions to mitigate those threats.
Finally, section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Differently from existing surveys, where works are classified
based on the revocation target (entities, data, and both), in
this work we also emphasize the studied adversary mod-
els, in addition to clarifying the main differences between
trust-based and cryptography-based solutions, highlighting
the advantages and drawbacks of the proposed solutions in
each category, and defining a security model able to combine
both strategies.
In the literature we can find several surveys on this
topic [11]–[14], although most of them solely tackle
cryptography-based solutions when dealing with the different
VANET threats.
However, most of the exiting works focus on the security
aspects without taking VANET application requirements into
account in terms of cooperation level among vehicles and
delay sensitivity issues.
The work in [15] offers a summary about state-of-
the-art solutions for VANETs, in addition to VANETs’
security challenges and associated cryptographic solutions.
Works [16], [17] are the newest surveys in this category.
Karn and Gupta [17] refer only a few VANET threats,
and focus mainly on the Sybil attack and its probable
solutions, whereas [16] focuses on techniques and tech-
nologies used to secure vehicular networks in a general
way, but without actually describing any kind of adversary
model.
On the other hand, only a few surveys [10], [18], [19] deal
with trust management for VANETs. In [10] and [18] authors
adopt the same classical categorization depending on the
revocation target as follows: entity-oriented, data-oriented,
and hybrid trust models. Moreover, while showing the main
steps for building a good trust system, both works handle trust
management in a separated manner, without acknowledging
where and when it is better to use trust instead of cryptogra-
phy, and the opposite. Instead, [19] provides a systematic and
quantitative review about how many papers addressing these
topics exist, along with information about their keywords and
publishers.
Differently from existing surveys, in this work we provide
the reader with an adversary-oriented survey of the trust-
based solutions for VANETs, detailing when and where trust
is a better choice than cryptography for enhancing VANET
security. We also show the studied adversary models, and
discuss the limits of trust-based solutions. At the end, we
point out those threats able to bypass both cryptography and
trust, together with some possible solutions to these threats.
An evaluation of methods regarding the existing trust-based
solutions is also provided.
III. VANET SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND THREATS
Same as all kinds of networks, VANET security requirements
are divided into five main axes in addition to the privacy con-
cerns: availability, authenticity, confidentiality, integrity, and
non-repudiation [20]. However, in VANET environments,
attacks addressing availability are the most dangerous since
they directly affect safety-critical situations. In the following
sections we describe the different VANET security require-
ments, and we then classify the main existing threats.
A. VANET SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Securing vehicular communications is a complex issue, with
plenty of challenges to be addressed which can be grouped in
six different requirements.
1) Availability: it is the most important factor to account
for in VANETs since it is directly related to all safety
applications. Maintaining the network’s functionality
is an availability issue, and so a security framework
should ensure the presence of the required informa-
tion or service, as well as the communications band-
width, at any time. Hence, the most dangerous attacks
taking place in VANETs address availability more
than any other security aspect. Both trust-based and
cryptography-based approaches allow securing the net-
work in the presence of an infrastructure, although
trust-based approaches are better options for fully dis-
tributed scenarios.
2) Authenticity: it is also among themajor security aspects
to account for. It includes identification, authentication,
and access control. By adopting security certificates
and signatures, it represents the first line of defense
against any external danger. Vehicle authenticity can be
achieved by using cryptographic solutions alone.
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3) Confidentiality: Through the use of certificates and
the shared public keys all exchanged messages can be
encrypted and, hence, all peer-to-peer communications
can become confidential (illegible) for all intermediate
vehicles. However, in a VANET context, safety mes-
sages and neighboring discovery messages (beacons)
should remain clear and readable by all receiving vehi-
cles. Also notice that confidentiality is ensured through
cryptographic solutions, but not by trust-based
solutions.
4) Integrity:Data integrity and trustiness is about ensuring
that messages have not been modifiedor reduced by
an intermediate node. Achieving these requirements
is a difficult task in any distributed system. In the
specific case of VANETs, it can be ensured through the
public key infrastructure and cryptography revocation
mechanisms. However, for fully distributed cases, even
trust management can be used when choosing the most
trusted packet relay, thereby avoiding nodes trying to
drop, modify, or inject new messages.
5) Non-repudiation: This service matches the vehicles’
real identity with their actions. Hence, it can be used
when a certain node tries to deny that it was sending
specific messages. Signatures are the main technique
used to avoid this kind of attack. Hence, only cryptogra-
phy approaches can satisfy this particular requirement.
6) Privacy: Vehicle privacy is an important issue in
VANETs, as it includes both position and identity pri-
vacy. Pseudonym changing techniques are the main
solution adopted to provide this security service.
To satisfy all the aforementioned requirements, cryp-
tography and trust have been combined together in many
approaches [21]–[23]. In fact, they are also used together
in secure key distribution contexts [24], [25] and privacy-
preserving communications [26], [27].
B. VANET THREATS
Same as any open network using a shared medium, VANETs
suffer from a variety of vulnerabilities. In fact, the damage
associated to some security attacks can withhold the different
applications from performing correctly. Even if the target
is a specific service, for sure other related services will be
affected as well. Since VANET applications can be classified
into safety, security, and infotainment, below we provide
an application-oriented classification of the main VANET
threats. In particular, this classification shows in which kind
of applications the impact of each type of attack is high.
Anyway, we should keep in mind that every attack has a
negative impact on all kinds of applications, and not only in
one of them. Figure 1 summarizes the main existing threats,
and which applications are affected the most according to the
three categories defined below:
• Attacks addressing secure communications,
• Attacks addressing safety applications,
• Attacks addressing infotainment applications,
FIGURE 1. Application-oriented VANET security threats.
1) ATTACKS ADDRESSING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
Achieving secure and confidential communications is a
main concern on all networks, also including safety and
infotainment. Thus, VANET security suffers from many
threats including, but not limited to, the certificate replica-
tion attack, the eavesdropping attack, and identity/location
privacy attacks.
• Certificate Replication Attack: In this attack a dishonest
node uses a certain number of replicated certificates
at the same time to avoid being traced/tracked by the
authorities, or by other vehicles. Dishonest vehicles can
also behave smartly by discarding any detected certifi-
cate to avoid being black-listed or identified using this
detected certificate (see Figure 2 (J)).
• Eavesdropping Attack: Recently known as APT for
Advanced Persistent Threat [28], [29], eavesdropping
attacks occur when a dishonest vehicle with a valid
certificate behaves as a spy, therefore gathering all pos-
sible information. Notice that the impact of such a
passive behaviour on the network is not instantaneous
or very evident, but it can nevertheless be the cause
of many attacks on privacy, confidentiality and cyber
security [30], [31].
• Attacks on Privacy: Vehicles/Driver identities/location
privacy should always be ensured. Various kinds of
attacks can be launched against privacy-preserving sys-
tems, including both tracking systems and the advanced
persistent threat described above. Similarly to eaves-
dropping attacks, the impact of attacks addressing pri-
vacy appear in a delayed manner, meaning that an
attacker can use its target identity, location, or certificate
to launch another attack without being detected.
2) ATTACKS THAT ENDANGER SAFETY APPLICATIONS
Safety applications are the main aim of cooperative ITS.
Since all safety applications are based on multi-hop and
delay-sensitive information exchange. Attacks belonging to
this category are mostly related to the channel occupation.
• Denial of Service Attacks: This famous type of attack,
known as DoS, occurs when a set of dishonest vehi-
cles send a high rate of messages, effectively blocking
all possible actions by the target. This attack can be
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FIGURE 2. Main VANET security attacks.
launched in a distributed manner by many attack-
ers simultaneously, hence becoming a distributed DoS
(DDoS), which is similar to the coalition attack with a
target/time synchronization [32](See Figure 2 (E2)).
• Jamming Attack: As shown in Figure 2 (E1), this attack
is similar to the DoS attack, but now the target is the
shared bandwidth. It occurs when a dishonest vehicle
tries to hold channel access continuously through
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different strategies including beacons, frequency chang-
ing, medium access backoff cheating, and alert injection.
This is among the most dangerous attacks for safety
applications since it avoids that valid safety alerts are
disseminated.
• Coalition and Platooning Attack: This attack occurs
when a group of dishonest vehicles situated in the
same geographical area or moving together collaborate
for malicious purposes such as excluding honest nodes
from network operations, malicious bandwidth usage,
or service consumption in the case of vehicular clouds.
Figures 2 (B) and (D) illustrate these types of attacks.
• Betrayal Attack: Similar to the masquerading attack, the
betrayal attack occurs when a honest vehicle suddenly
turns into a malicious node, starting to send malicious
messages or fake alerts.
3) ATTACKS ON INFOTAINMENT APPLICATIONS
Infotainment applications are all those related to passengers’
comfort, and most of them are based on relay selection
strategies for message exchanges. Bellow we list the most
dangerous attacks on infotainment applications.
• Replayed, Altered, and Injected Messages Attack:
As illustrated in Figure 2 (I), dishonest vehicles can
replicate many copies of the same message, modify
the message, or create and inject new messages in the
system while acting as a relay node for inter-vehicular
communication. These attacks can clearly reduce the
performance of all network applications, as well as the
exchanged data trustiness.
• Illusion Attack: This attack is mostly related to hard-
ware components, and it occurs when an authenticated
attacker implements some vulnerabilities at the sensing
level. Hence, generated information is not valid.
4) COMMON ATTACKS AGAINST BOTH SECURE
COMMUNICATIONS AND SAFETY APPLICATIONS
In addition to the aforementioned attacks, security and safety
applications also share some common vulnerabilities includ-
ing the following:
• Masquerading Attack: the adversary in this attack is a
dishonest vehicle that uses a valid identity/certificate
called mask to take advantage of network resources.
Hence, it can perform maliciously without being
detected (See Figure 2 (A)).
• Impersonation Attack:This attack occurs when a vehicle
provides its valid identity to an attacker. This way, the
latter can launch attacks able to bypass the authentica-
tion process.
5) COMMON ATTACKS AGAINST BOTH SECURE
COMMUNICATIONS AND INFOTAINMENT
APPLICATIONS
Some attacks have almost the same severity level on both
security and infotainment applications; the main attacks in
this category are the Sybil and the GPS position faking
attacks.
• Sybil Attack: This attack is similar to the botnet attack
where an attacker is able to manage a certain number
of controlled/penetrated vehicles (real/virtual identities
in real/virtual positions), and so it can launch attacks
using these vehicles as shown in Figure 2 (G). Hence, the
attackers can be either honest vehicles that lack security
measures, or dishonest vehicles.
• GPS Position Faking Attack: The second attack in this
category is illustrated in Figure 2 (H), and it occurs
when an attacker broadcasts fake positioning informa-
tion which can punish certain applications based on
geographical routing, or even nodes located at that same
falsified position.
6) COMMON ATTACKS AGAINST BOTH SAFETY AND
INFOTAINMENT APPLICATIONS
Last but not least, some attacks are dangerous for both safety
and infotainment applications. These attacks are mainly tim-
ing attacks, blackholes, and grayholes attacks.
• Timing Attack: the delay in the packet delivery process
can be even more dangerous than actually dropping
these packets. The principle of this attack is that the dis-
honest vehicles store the transmitted packets for a certain
period of time before sending them again, which can
cause plenty of problems to both safety and infotainment
applications. This case is illustrated in Figure 2 (C).
• Blackhole Attack: Massive packet dropping is also
among the known attacks. It consist of discarding abso-
lutely all received packets, as illustrated in Figure 2 (F1).
• Grayhole Attack: Finally, the last attack, which is also
known as selective forwarding, occurs when a dishonest
vehicle randomly selects some packets to forward while
dropping the others to avoid being detected. This princi-
ple is illustrated in Figure 2 (F2).
Besides the application-oriented classification, Table 1
shows what are the security services targeted by every attack.
It also shows in which category these attacks are better han-
dled by either trust or cryptography
C. DISTINGUISHING CRYPTOGRAPHY FROM TRUST
Trust management can be seen as an additional security
level to address the shortcomings of classical cryptography
solutions, being typically required against inside attackers in
possession of valid certificates (see Figure 3).
From a security perspective, both trust and cryptography
can be used against a group or a single attacker within the
network. However, differently from trust-based solutions,
cryptography cannot handle inside attackers. Both techniques
can detect rational (the attacker uses a predefined strategy in
order to reach a defined benefit, and the attack stops once the
aim is reached) and irrational (a suicide bombing attack, for
instance) attacks.
Notice that both techniques handle active attackers alone.
Thus, passive attackers remain mostly undetected since they
VOLUME 4, 2016 9297
C. A. Kerrache et al.: Trust Management for Vehicular Networks: An Adversary-Oriented Overview
TABLE 1. Security threats target and solutions category.
FIGURE 3. Inside and outside attackers in VANETs.
TABLE 2. Features of Trust-based and Cryptography-based solutions.
do not perform any malicious action. Notice that the aim
of such passive attacks is to gather as much information
as possible in order to prepare for another more danger-
ous attack. Advanced-persistent-threat (APT) attacks are the
main example of such passive, hard to detect, and dangerous
behaviour [29], [33], [34]. In addition, it is worth highlighting
that cryptography-based solutions have a higher detection
accuracy compared to trust-based solutions.
From a network perspective, trust management solutions
are mostly dedicated to distributed and semi-centralized
computing since they can be effective independently of the
exchanged traffic, and despite network mobility. On the con-
trary, cryptography-based solutions can achieve high perfor-
mance levels, especially in the case of centralized computing
and delay-tolerant traffic.
Table 2 summarizes the main differences between
cryptography-based and trust-based solutions for improving
VANET security.
Taking both cryptography and trust features into account,
Figure 4 summarizes VANET security requirements together
with trust management use cases. It shows that cryptography
can be used for all authentication/authorization cases, con-
fidential communication, and both non-repudiation and data
integrity. Differently from it, trust is instead applicable to
privacy preservation, availability, distributed key distribution,
and message delivery.
FIGURE 4. VANET security requirements and trust management use cases.
IV. TRUST MANAGEMENT FOR VANETs
Despite their many advantages, we find that all cryptography-
based approaches are prone to introduce excessive delays
in order to accomplish all the required checks since the
computation power of an On Board Unit (OBU) is limited.
Also, the verification of messages coming from unknown
vehicles involves exchanging public certificates, which leads
to a high message overhead. Notice that, even though we
translate the verification tasks to a nearby RSU, the huge
number of messages sent in a small time period does not
allow reducing this delay, which becomes critical especially
in safety-related scenarios [35]. Thus, most of the existing
protocols focus on vehicle-to-infrastructure communication,
and try to perform a quick batch verification of the exchanged
messages [36]–[38].
Since in this work we focus solely on trust-based solutions,
we refer the reader to the previous survey papers, including
9298 VOLUME 4, 2016
C. A. Kerrache et al.: Trust Management for Vehicular Networks: An Adversary-Oriented Overview
TABLE 3. Main trust-based solutions.
but not limited to [15] and [17], for a detailed description
about cryptography-based solutions.
Trust management was mainly conceived to decide
whether to believe or disbelieve information asserted by
other peers. This belief should only take into account
statements coming from trustworthy peers. Existing Trust-
based solutions for VANETs are usually classified into
entity-based [39]–[41], data-based [42], [43], and hybrid
trust models, depending on the revocation target, which
can be dishonest entities, malicious messages, or both of
them [21], [44], [45].
Existing works have chosen different architectures; some
of them are RSU-based, others are fully distributed, and
yet others deal with privacy issues. Moreover, many works
consider official vehicles (e.g. police cars, ambulances, etc.)
as fully trustable, thus having a positive impact on securing
communication among vehicles.
It is also worth pointing out that most works deal with all
kinds of messages and applications, while only a few ones are
specific to event-related and alert dissemination situations.
Table 3 summarizes the main existing works in chronolog-
ical order:
Existing trust models can be classified according to the
topology and vehicles organization strategy adopted as fol-
lows: (i) inter-cluster communication where a chosen vehicle
makes the messages relay decision according to its cluster
member opinions; (ii) flat communication where all vehicles
behave autonomously; or (iii) when vehicles are within the
range of an RSU, the latter plays the role of a sink handling
all communications.
Overall, we find that most of the existing trust models focus
on routing, path disruption, and resource exhaustion attacks,
including blackholes and bogus messages’ injection. In the
following, we survey and classify the main existing works
depending on their adversary models.
FIGURE 5. Replayed, altered, and injected messages attacks.
1) Trust-based solutions against replayed, altered, and
injected messages: This kind of attacks, illustrated in
Figure 5, can cause huge damage, especially in safety-
related contexts. Hence, most of the existing works fall
under this category.
The entity-oriented trust models: presented
in [39] and [40] try to revoke nodes by sending falsified
messages and fake information, respectively, using dif-
ferent techniques. Haddadou et al. [39] chose to asso-
ciate a credit value to each neighbor vehicle. This credit
will increase or decrease depending on the concerned
neighbor’s messages trustiness. Hence, this credit will
be quickly decreased when replaying or injecting new
messages. Concerning Yang’s solution [40], it uses the
Euclidean distance to compute the similarity between
nodes in terms of reported events, deleting redundant or
inadequate messages. Unfortunately, the first solution
does not differentiate between direct and indirect trust,
while the second one faces a huge problem in the case
of simultaneous events.
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The work in [47] represents a distributed reputation
system called VARS. In this proposal, peers can gener-
ate opinions about a message based on the aggregated
opinions of other nodes and the evaluation of direct
interactions with the sender. In order to give more
importance to the opinions coming from the closest
nodes to the reported event, Dotzer et al. distinguish
three areas: event, decision, and distribution. The main
disadvantage of this scheme is the overhead added to
messages by including the other trusted nodes’ opin-
ions. In addition, the case where a malicious node is the
first to report about other nodes is not well investigated,
as its opinion will affect all the opinions that follow.
The detection of attacks related to message quality is a
process that is usually based on messages themselves,
which explains why some of the existing works within
this category are Data-oriented trust models [43], [46].
Golle et al. [46] have adapted a signature-based tech-
nique where every received message is compared to a
typical model of legal VANET messages. The problem
with this solution is that it is not feasible to actu-
ally build such a global model; in addition, all new
legal messages will be dropped as well. Unlike [46],
Gurung et al. [43] use three main metrics to classify
received messages into either legal or malicious mes-
sages; these metrics are content similarity, content con-
flict, and routing path similarity. However, in addition
to its high time complexity, this solution does not take
into account the high level of mobility associated to
VANETs, nor the case of node sparsity.
A distinguished reputation scheme for VANETs based
on a fuzzy computational model is developed in [41].
In this work, nodes are classified regarding their close-
ness to the events as follows: event reporter (ER), event
observer (EO) and event participant (EP). Moreover,
using the messages’ timestamp, they define six degrees
ofmessage honesty representing the combination of the
three previous classes and the freshness of information.
Nevertheless, this event-based scheme is very limited,
and it cannot preserve a good message quality because,
except for safety messages, the other kinds of messages
are not related to a specific event.
Some Hybrid trust models have been also proposed
in this same context. In particular, Zhang et al. [44]
propose a semi-distributed trust framework for mes-
sage propagation and evaluation; in their approach, the
clusterheads are responsible for broadcasting and then
gathering opinions about the broadcasted messages.
Afterward, they decide either to drop untrustworthy
messages or relay legal messages with the aggregated
opinions to the next cluster in order to continue with the
dissemination process. Similarly to other cluster-based
techniques, the clusterhead election and the probabil-
ity of malicious nodes becoming clusterheads are the
main problems of this solution. Differently from the
aforementioned work, Mármol and Pérez [52] prefer
associating a confidence value to exchanged messages,
in addition to the gathered recommendations from both
RSU and nearby vehicles, to build three fuzzy sets
(no trust,+/−trust, trust). Themessage will be dropped
if it belongs to the first set, accepted but not forwarded
for the second set’s case, and both accepted and for-
warded for the trusted messages set. The number of
recommendations and their trustworthiness remain as
the pending problems of this solution.
FIGURE 6. Blackhole attack.
2) Trust-based solutions against blackholes: Inter-
vehicular communication is the enabling process sup-
porting ITS over VANETs. Hence, forcing nodes to be
collaborative is an indispensable task. Solutions falling
under this category try to detect selfish nodes acting
as blackholes (see Figure 6) in order to ensure a more
efficient forwarding process for both safety and data
messages.
The Entity-oriented trust model proposed by
Khan et al. [59] proposes computing a distrust level
for every neighbor acting as a blackhole through a
watchdog technique. This distrust level will be sent to
the clusterhead, and in turn delivered to a third trusted
party that revokes the attacker certificate. Unfortu-
nately, authors did not detail the different communi-
cation steps involved, nor the overhead associated to
the cluster-based implementation. Our previous work,
called TROUVE [57], differs from this one by taking
advantage of existing CAM messages, which are peri-
odically exchanged according to the ETSI-ITS Euro-
pean standard [63], in order to estimate the distribution
of the selfish nodes within the network and, hence,
select the most trusted path avoiding these blackholes.
However, this solution only addresses unicast data
traffic in urban environments.
To deal with blackholes and the selective forwarding
(greyholes) procedure, some Hybrid trust models are
also available [21], [61]. The first solution, proposed
by Sedjelmaci et al., is a two-level intrusion detection
system, the first one being based on a collaborative
in-cluster detection, and the second one on a global
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detection processed by the RSU. The main weaknesses
of this solution are the excessive time associated to
clusterhead election, and the assumption of having sta-
ble clusters around fixed RSUs.
The work of Haddadou et al. [61], called DTM2, pro-
poses forcing nodes to be cooperative by establishing
a communication cost. The latter is higher for selfish
nodes, decreasing alongside with in-network collab-
orativity. How to choose the initial cost, and how to
differentiate between selfish behavior and packet losses
due to propagation issues, are the mains questionable
points of this work.
FIGURE 7. Jamming and denial of service (DoS) attacks.
3) Trust-based solutions against jamming and denial
of service (DoS) attacks: Similarly to blackholes,
jamming and DoS attacks can also prevent important
information from being delivered on time, thereby dis-
turbing VANET functionality (see Figure 7).
Raya et al. [42] propose a Data-oriented trust model
for Ad-hoc ephemeral networks. This model uses
different trust metrics, in addition to the a priory
fixed entities trust (e.g. Trust(Police vehicles = 1;
ordinary vehicles = 0.5)), in order to detect whether
the reported events are real, or if it is just an attempt to
jam bandwidth. They also propose evaluating the evi-
dences related to the reported events using Dempster-
Shafer theory and Bayesian inference. The problems of
their solution are the fixed entities trust and the required
training phase, which cannot be ensured in practice.
In a previous work [56], we proposed a hybrid trust
model in order to enhance the message relaying proce-
dure and to detect DoS attacks in a fast manner through
the use of an intrusion detection module. The latter
takes advantage of the access categories of 802.11p,
in the context of dedicated short-range communica-
tions (DSRC), to classify the received messages at
an early stage and, hence, accelerate the intrusion
detection process. Same as all existing solutions, this
approach assumes that the adversary has a malicious
behaviour that remains stable throughout time, thus not
being a valid solution under nodes having an intelligent
dishonest behaviour.
In addition to the Denial of Service and message drop-
ping attacks, our previous work also addressed the
coalition and platooning attacks. Taking advantage of
the standardized messaging services of ETSI ITS, our
solution called T-VNets [62] could estimate the traffic
as well as the attackers distribution within the network.
By achieving high detection ratios and a low overhead,
the T-VNets proposal is the only trust architecture that
uses and acknowledges the standardization efforts.
FIGURE 8. Fake location and timing attacks.
4) Trust-based solutions against fake location and timing
attacks: Figure 8 illustrates the fake location and timing
attacks.
TheData-oriented trust model proposed by Shaikh and
Alzahrani [55] is an intrusion-aware trust model that
differs from other works by being capable of detecting
fake location and timing values generated either by the
event’s reporter or the message forwarder. In this event-
related solution, authors propose the computation of
a confidence value for each message coming from a
unique source. In addition, for all messages describing
a same event, a trust value is calculated using the
previously computed confidence information. Finally,
accepting or rejecting an event message depends on its
trust value. Despite the high accuracy of this approach,
we find that it introduces a high delay, which is not
acceptable when targeting VANET safety applications.
5) Trust-based solutions with unspecified adversarial
model: In addition to the aforementioned trust models,
in some works authors do not specify an adversarial
model, nor the types of attack they support. Instead,
they only address trust establishment over the inter-
vehicular communication link.
The only Entity-oriented trust model falling under this
categorywas proposed by Jesudoss et al. [58]. In partic-
ular, authors propose a clustering technique to reduce
the communication overhead and assign a reputation
weight to all nodes participating in the clusterhead
election and network control tasks by sharing their
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reports about exchanged traffic. Unfortunately, this
scheme does not embrace reference trust metrics such
as direct and indirect trust. Moreover, high mobility
levels can cause this scheme’s performance to decrease
considerably.
Works [45], [53], [54], [60] are examples of Hybrid
trust approaches.
Li et al. [53] propose a reputation-based trust estab-
lishment scheme for VANETs where the messages and
their senders are evaluated based on the direct trust,
indirect trust and node reputations. The main drawback
of this scheme is its centralized trust computing pro-
cedure through the use of an additional infrastructure
Called RMC (Reputation Management Center). This
RMC is responsible for all revocation decisions.
Under the assumption that all application messages are
encrypted, Chen et al. [54] propose a beacon-based
trust model for enhancing users’ location privacy in
VANETs. The proposed system can secure the VANET
while maintaining privacy by using two kinds of mes-
sages: beacons and event-based messages. The main
idea is crosschecking the plausibility of these two types
of messages to decide if other messages are trusted or
not. Despite preserving the privacy of far-away vehicles
(at more than one hop), this scheme cannot efficiently
evaluate all kinds of messages, nor can it detect attacks
occurring at upper layers (routing, application, etc.).
In addition, whenever an obstacle appears between
two neighboring vehicles, this scheme causes those
two vehicles to judge each other as being a liar and
malicious.
In [48] authors propose constructing a trust system
based on node reputation to secure communications
and preserve the location privacy of vehicles. In this
solution, a belief-based trust is calculated using three
metrics: the situational trust, the event-based trust, and
the dispositional trust. However, there is no descrip-
tion of how different metrics are combined, neither the
exchanged traffic and adversary model.
To ensure the privacy of nodes within dynamic groups,
a trust model is proposed [49]. In this scheme, only the
cluster-heads are in charge of exchanging information
or disseminating it to group members. Despite being
able to preserve privacy, this scheme has two main
shortcomings: first, a security weakness is detected
when the group leader is compromised or malicious
nodes launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attack. Second, it is hard to see how groups can be
formed based on heterogeneous entities because group
formation is often related to the presence of vehicles in
a specific geographical area. A model similar to [49]
using ant colony routing is proposed in [51]. The
clusters are formed around the RSUs, or around the
slowest and most trusted vehicles. For each message
sent by a node, the clusterhead gathers the members’
opinions about that node and generates a decision about
the message. The ant colony algorithm is used to
choose the best path between different clusters using
boundary nodes. The main weaknesses of this work are
the use of a static clusterhead and the slow forwarding
decision due to the opinion gathering process.
In another work [50], authors propose a trust model
based on the formalization of the trust metrics’ vari-
ation using a Markovian chain; this way, each vehicle
has to evaluate and assign a trust weight to its neighbors
based on the formalized model. Evidently, the decision
process about the identities’ honesty and the messages’
validity is purely local, a process authors denote as
’monitoring process’, meaning that each monitored
vehicle will have its trust value increased, decreased,
or unchanged in the monitoring registry. The main lim-
itation of this model is the limited local knowledge of
vehicles, which is easy to overcome through a betrayal
behavior and different DOS attacks, especially due to
the re-execution of the markovian process for each
received message.
T-CLAIDS [45] is another work providing a trust-
aware intrusion detection solution for VANETs. This
solution takes into account the number of vehicles,
their mobility, and their motion direction to perform
an action. It also maintains a probability matrix of all
actions which is updated in the iterations that follow
until convergence to a particular value is achieved. This
way, it offers an approximate representation of a global
knowledge about the environment. Unfortunately, even
if this solution shows good results in the general case
where malicious behaviors are stable throughout time,
it looks questionable in the case of unpredictable events
or attacks. Also, convergence time may be very long
in sparse cases since it will be hard to gather all the
information required to have a global view.
Last but not least, Rostamzadeh et al. [60] try to divide
the map into different areas, and the traffic into three
categories: safety, infotainment, and third party ser-
vices, such as inter-transportation vehicular communi-
cation. In this solution, called ‘‘FACT,’’ the message
source should be known by piggybacking the identi-
ties of all vehicles participating in the routing process.
Meanwhile, an admission module is responsible for
analyzing the messages using the traffic category and
the piggybacked identities’ trust. If the degree of satis-
faction is high, a trusted path is selected for the mes-
sage. Unfortunately, this solution adds a considerable
overhead and processing delay. Moreover, authors do
not provide information about its security performance.
V. VANET TRUST MODELS’ EVALUATION METHODS
The evaluation part of existing trust models for VANETs
is mostly done through simulations. In particular, most of
these proposals have used the NS-2 simulator [64]. Moreover,
some proposals have adopted other existing simulation
tools such as NS-3 [65], Matlab [66], TRMSIM-V2V [67],
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GrooveNet [68], TraNS [69], SWANS++ [70], and
Veins [71]. In addition, in some works, authors have chosen
to develop their own simulator instead of using the existing
simulators relying on either C++ or Java programming
languages.
It is worth pointing out that in [51] authors did not specify
which tool they used, whereas the authors of [45] mention
that they used VanetMobisim [72] as a simulator, when the
latter is in fact a mobility trace generator. Hence, further
details about how authors modified this tool to consider all
simulation patterns should be provided.
Besides the simulation experiments, other works only
offer a theoretical analysis and discussion of their proposals.
We also noticed that only one work has used Markov chains
as an analytical validation method.
FIGURE 9. Evaluation tools of existing trust models for VANETs.
Figure 9 summarizes the existing trust models evaluation
methods together with the selected simulators and environ-
ments.
We should also mention that there is no real testbed imple-
mentation of any of the existing trust models. Hence, imple-
menting and testing either existing or new proposals is highly
recommended.
A drawback found in most of the available solutions is
that they do not mention which propagation models are used
for inter-vehicular communications. Thus, it does not matter
which environment is simulated (highway, freeway, or urban)
if we do not use realistic propagation and mobility models
that take into account all relevant factors, including: signal
attenuation, multi-path fading, obstacles, etc. The absence of
such realistic models clearly affects any studied performance
metrics.
Many works have studied and clarified the impact of the
propagationmodels in inter-vehicular communication includ-
ing [73], [74]. The obtained results show that the end-to-end
delay and packet delivery ratio were clearly affected when
varying the attenuation scheme with obstacles, and using
a real map layout, compared to those when varying the
attenuation scheme without obstacles and using a Manhat-
tan layout. Both results also differ from those obtained
when using the realistic attenuation scheme and varying the
visibility/layout schemes.
Similarly to radio propagation models, mobility models
have clearly a direct impact on network performance. For
instance, the work in [75] highlighted the relevance of mobil-
ity patterns when aiming at realistic vehicular mobility for
VANET simulations.
Table 4 summarizes the simulated solutions, together with
the evaluated metrics and the used propagation and mobility
models (if specified).
VI. OPEN RESEARCH ISSUES
Security is always considered as a continuously open research
field. Moreover, when focusing on safety applications affect-
ing human lives, as the case of VANETs, it becomes even
more so, attracting both research and industry interests.
Because of the wide range of security threats seeking
different network and security services, finding a single
security scheme able to deal with all parameters of interest
is a hard and quasi impossible task. Hence, towards this
objective, we believe that all proposals should follow and
enhance the major standards, projects and consortia including
3GPP/oneM2M/WAVE, 1609.2 [82], and ETSI ITS [83]
security models.
Besides, handling both location and identities privacy,
while ensuring efficient and reliable safetymessages’ dissem-
ination, is one of the open issues of existing trust models.
In addition, dealing with smart attackers is an issue that
remains mostly untackled in terms of VANET trust models
since all existing models assume that their adversary has a
stable and continuous malicious behaviour, which facilitates
the detection process.
As mentioned is section I, trust can be defined as the
evaluation of the historical interactions among peers. The
fact that trust is based on these historical interactions may
affect its robustness and make it susceptible to some attacks,
such as the On-Off and the Newcomer attacks. In these
kinds of attacks, attackers behave smartly to avoid being
detected. Hence, they either alternate between legal and ille-
gal behaviours (i.e. Betrayal and tracking-based attacks),
stopping all network activity until meeting new nodes
that have no previous knowledge about their behaviour
(i.e. On-Off and Newcomer attacks), control a certain number
of nodes having lack of security measurements and launch
attacks using their identities (i.e. Sybil attack), or keep within
a coalition or a platoon of attackers, assuring this way that
only positive recommendations about each other are dissem-
inated (i.e. Bad-mouthing, coalition, and platooning attacks).
Figure 10 summarizes the main VANET threats, together
with those attacks that most of the existing trust models
cannot overcome.
Despite the rule that a good trust strategy is the one were
trust is hard to get but can be easily lost, when an inside
attacker becomes aware of the game rules, both cryptography
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TABLE 4. Simulation tools and performance evaluation metrics.
FIGURE 10. VANET security threats and attacks against trust
management.
and trust are easily bypassed. Figure 11 shows an example of
a smart attacker behaviour to avoid being detected.
Therefore, new trust models for VANETs should be able
to cope with smart attackers. To this end, many techniques
can be used such as the adaptive detection threshold and
behaviour variation estimation. For instance, our recent
work [84] is the first approach that attempts to address such
smart dishonest behavior. In particular, it evaluates the vehi-
cles’ honesty instead of the whole experiments. Afterward, a
riskmetric representing the trust variation during the different
time slots is obtained in order to detect smart attackers.
FIGURE 11. Intelligent dishonest behavior.
However, this solution requires a minimum number of inter-
actions (minimum density) to run.
Also, the last trust evaluation can be used for the next
re-keying/re-certification phases and, hence, smart attackers
will be dismissed from all network operations directly after
their initial attack attempt. Evaluating trust for separated time
intervals can also help in detecting dishonest nodes attempt-
ing to avoid being detected.
More important than performing extensive simulations,
there is a clear need to deploy real testbeds to assess the
effectiveness of the different trust-based proposals in real
scenarios.We also noticed that most existing solutions belong
to the application layer, which means they are software-based
and do not require specialized hardware or extra components.
Thus, the use of smartphones seems like the easiest and
less costly way to implement and test existing solutions.
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In fact, different researchers have already developed some
prototypes supporting vehicular communications using
smartphones [85]–[87].
Among the main open issues for VANET security and
trust is the human factor (i.e., the drivers’ degree of honesty
or selfishness). Since human honesty can clearly enhance
both security and safety in VANETs, this information can be
extracted from online social networks through trusted third
parties, as the latter are usually the only authorities able
to match the vehicle identity with the driver identity, and
to gather the driver’s Online Social Network (OSN) profile
based on the identity. To our knowledge, there is no trust-
based system for VANETs that has taken the human factor
into account the way we are suggesting. Furthermore, the
use of the social dimension for VANET purposes is already
existing in comfort applications like user preference estima-
tions [88]–[90] and leader selection [91].
Moreover, advanced persistent threats in the VANET con-
text are also among the worthwhile research issues to take
into account in trust management for VANETs.
Finally, there has been efforts for integrating Content Cen-
tric Network (CCN) and Named Data Networking (NDN)
in VANETs [92], [93]. Hence, future trust management
solutions should be able to cope with these future internet
challenges [94].
VII. CONCLUSION
Various security threats and different adversaries are
expectable when attempting to secure vehicular communi-
cations. In addition, other influential parameters in VANETs
should be taken into account by any security system, includ-
ing high mobility, open wireless medium, and the absence
of trusted infrastructures in some cases, like rural environ-
ments. In this review paper we first clarified the main threats
and adversary models handled by the existing trust-based
solutions. Secondly, we reviewed the main existing trust
establishment approaches in an adversary-oriented way. The
third point was dedicated to the trust management evaluation
strategies and their limits. Finally, we pointed out the main
open challenges for researchers willing to contribute to this
research area. We conclude that a robust security system
should include both cryptography and trust strategies to face
all kind of threats. Such a desirable system should have the
ability to alternate between cryptography and trust, depend-
ing on the context and the probable adversary in that context.
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